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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

THOMAS UMBERTO BANFIELD,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 47123-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-45883

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Umberto Banfield pied guilty to domestic battery. He was sentenced to a unified
term of ten years, with two years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. Mr. Banfield argues
that argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and,
later, by relinquishing jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In late August 2018, police responded to a domestic dispute at the residence of
Mr. Banfield and his long-time girlfriend, J.K. (PSI, p.3.) 1 J.K. alleged that over the course of
several hours, Mr. Banfield had physically assaulted her in the presence of her two children.
(PSI, p.3.) Mr. Banfield was then arrested and charged with domestic violence in the presence of
a child, and attempted strangulation. (R., pp.9-10.). The State then dismissed the original case
without prejudice, as "the State was not prepared to proceed to preliminary hearing." (R., p.96.)
A new complaint was then filed as an Amended Complaint in mid-October. (R., pp.4244.) In addition to the charges from the first Complaint, Mr. Banfield was also charged with two
counts of violating a no-contact order. (R., pp.42-44.) After being bound over, an Information
was filed with the four charges from the Amended Complaint. (R., pp.50-52.)
As part of a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Banfield' s attorney informed the court
that
Mr. Banfield will plead guilty to Count I. The State will move to amend Count I
from domestic violence in the presence to regular felony domestic violence,
striking any language that references the presence of the children. Mr. Banfield
will also plead guilty to Counts III and IV [no-contact order violations]. The State
would move to dismiss Count II [attempted strangulation].
(Tr., p.10, Ls.15-22.) The State agreed to dismiss another unrelated case. (Tr., p.10, Ls.22-24.)
The State also agreed to recommend probation with an underlying seven-year sentence, with two
years fixed, provided that Mr. Banfield complied with the recommendations from a domestic
violence evaluation. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-5.) "[A]ll other terms [were] open for argument." (Tr., p.12,
Ls.7-8.) After conducting a plea colloquy with Mr. Banfield regarding the three charges to which
he was pleading guilty, the court accepted his plea. (Tr., p.13, L.22 -p.27, L.24.)
1

References to the presentence investigation report ("PSI") are to the electronic file "Banfield
47123 psi.pd£"
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At the sentencing hearing, the court heard from the victim, J.K., who asked the court to
release Mr. Banfield on probation. (Tr., p.31, L.11 - p.36, L.21.) Consistent with the plea
agreement, the State recommended a suspended sentence of seven years, with two years fixed,
probation, and "365 days of jail at the Ada County jail to allow him to begin programming first
before he is released back into the community." (Tr., p.41, Ls.4-9.) Counsel for Mr. Banfield
also recommended that Mr. Banfield be placed on probation. (Tr., p.43, Ls.16-21.) It imposed a
sentence often years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.65, Ls.6-19.)2
Six months into Mr. Banfield's retained jurisdiction program ("rider"), the court held a
review hearing. (RR., Tr., pp.4-11.) 3 At that hearing, the State recommended that the district
court relinquish jurisdiction. (RR., Tr., p.4, Ls.11-21.) Counsel for Mr. Banfield asked that the
court allow him to complete his rider programming at a different correctional facility.
(RR., Tr., p.7, Ls.15-24.) When directly addressing the court, Mr. Banfield echoed his counsel's
statements and expressed particular interest in enrolling in the anger management course
originally recommended by the court. (RR., Tr., p.8, L.14 - p.9, L.2.) However, the court instead
relinquished jurisdiction and executed his underlying sentence of ten years, with two years fixed.
(Tr., p.9, L.13 -p.10, L.25.)
Mr. Banfield timely appealed from the court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.9192.)4
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In addition, over the objection of Mr. Banfield and the victim, the court also "sign[ed] an
absolute no-contact order." (Tr., p.65, Ls.20-21.)
3
References to the rider review hearing transcript will be cited as "RR., Tr.," and refer to the
electronic file "Banfield 47123 tr 06.17.19.pdf."
4
Mr. Banfield filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence just over three months after the court's
order relinquishing jurisdiction; however, that motion did not present any "new information that
the court could properly consider." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). Accordingly,
Mr. Banfield does not appeal the district court's denial of that motion three months later. (Denial
of Motion for Reduction of Sentence, iCourt Portal, last accessed April 24, 2020.)
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ISSUES
I.
II.

Did the district court impose an excessive sentence?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Banfield Following His Plea Of Guilty To Domestic Battery
A.

Introduction
Mr. Banfield asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten years,

with two years fixed, is excessive. Specifically, he asserts the district court abused its discretion
by failing to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors.

B.

Standard Of Review
There are "four objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society, (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). Even so, "the primary consideration is the good
order and protection of society, [and a]ll other factors must be subservient to that end." State v.

Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982) (internal quotation marks and citations removed).
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When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original). "However, in

exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement." State v. Nice, I 03 Idaho
89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982) (citing State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 604 P.2d 737 (1979)).
"'[R]easonableness' implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to the purposes for
which the sentence is imposed." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).
Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant. See State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that when reviewing a sentence, Idaho's appellate

courts will "review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest"); State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726 (2007) (same). This includes consideration of the support a defendant has from his
family. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter
alia, had the support of his family and his employer). In addition, a defendant "working and

helping to support his children at the time of the conviction" can be mitigating evidence in favor
of the defendant. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). A defendant's acceptance of
responsibility or remorse for his conduct is also a mitigating factor. See State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing the defendant's sentence, in part, because "the defendant has
accepted responsibility for his acts"); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that some leniency was required, in part, because the defendant expressed "remorse for
his conduct"). Courts should also look at "a willingness to seek treatment" as a mitigating factor.
State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008).
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C.

The District Court Imposed An Excessive Sentence Without Giving Proper Weight To
Mitigating Factors
Mr. Banfield asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten years,

with two years fixed, is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Banfield submits that the court did not give
sufficient weight to mitigating factors such as the support of his family, his employability and
willingness to financially care for his family, his acceptance of responsibility and remorse for his
actions, and his amenability to treatment.
Mr. Banfield has been supported by his family, including the victim of his offense and
her children, throughout this entire process. At sentencing, the victim, J.K., gave a victim impact
statement where she described how her children "love their daddy" despite them not being his
biological children. (Tr., p.35, Ls.19-22; PSI, p.5 ("Thomas might not be their biological father,
but, he is the only daddy they know and will ever have.").) She asked the court at sentencing, and
in a letter sent to the court, for the no-contact order to be lifted so the children could be with him.
(See Tr., p.36, Ls.5-11; PSI, p.5.) At the sentencing hearing, J.K. also reported that she and her
children were homeless. (Tr., p.34, L.19.) In the letter she sent the court before sentencing, she
said that Mr. Banfield "wants nothing more than to provide for his family, as we are still
homeless, living in a shelter and struggling daily without his support, both mentally and
financially." (PSI, p. 7.)
Mr. Banfield has accepted responsibility for his role in this crime, telling the court that "I
would just like to apologize to [J.K.], my children if they were here, and the courts for what is
going on right now." (Tr., p.50, Ls.18-20; see also PSI, p.17 ("I want to [apologize] to my
family.").) Mr. Banfield has acknowledged he needs help and assistance. (See Tr., p.49, L.22 p.50, L.3 (discussing conversations he has had with "different counselors" and others regarding
things he could change).) Mr. Banfield told the presentence investigator that "he had talked to
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[J.K.] about marnage counseling pnor to being arrested for this crime." (PSI, p.16.) The
prosecutor agreed at sentencing that domestic violence treatment would be "appropriate."
(Tr., p.41, Ls.12-14.) But counsel for Mr. Banfield informed the court that the recommended 52week domestic violence classes "are not available in custody to do." (Tr., p.44, Ls.5-6.)
Accordingly, Mr. Banfield asserts the sentence imposed by the district court was
excessive and an abuse of discretion because it did not give the mitigating factors in the record
sufficient weight.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
A.

Introduction
Mr. Banfield asserts that when the district court relinquished jurisdiction and executed his

underlying sentence, it abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation is committed to the district

judge's discretion." State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also State v. Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684 (Ct. App. 2018) ("The decision to place a
defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a
matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of that discretion"). As previously discussed, a court's discretionary decisions
will be reviewed for four essentials. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). "A
court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial
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court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate." State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889 (Ct. App. 2013).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
Mr. Banfield asserts that by not allowing him to complete the rehabilitation and

programming available in the retained jurisdiction program, the court abused its discretion.
During the rider review hearing, counsel for Mr. Banfield said, "It is somewhat troubling that the
program put him in the substance abuse and the Thinking for a Change rather than the aggressor
in placement [sic] that may have been more appropriate given the nature of the charges."
(RR., Tr., p.7, Ls.1-4.) This was despite the court's specific statement at sentencing that it was
"going to retain jurisdiction so that he can get the ART program, the Aggression Replacement
Therapy" in addition to those other classes. (Tr., p.64, L.22 - p.65, L. 1.) The court
acknowledged this was also a "serious concern to me that he needs aggression replacement
therapy." (RR., Tr., p.10, Ls.19-21.)
Mr. Banfield discussed how he has "learned a lot about [himself] during the rider
program. (RR., Tr., p.8, Ls.2-3.) He also discussed how the administrators and teachers within
the rider program, along with the correctional officers he has worked with, have all "seen a large
change" in his behaviors and thinking. (RR., Tr., p.8, Ls.4-8.) He admitted to his initial struggles
during the program, but discussed how those in charge of the programming had helped him
overcome those struggles. (RR., Tr., p.8, Ls.9-12.) He also relayed his discussions with officials
at the new location where he was now being housed expressed their willingness to allow him to
continue his programming there "because [he] had nine weeks left to graduation." (RR., Tr., p.8,
L.20 - p.9, L.2.) He ended by "asking if I could possibly finish this out at the facility I'm at now
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to accomplish what I was trying to learn and hopefully be released on probation." (RR., Tr., p.9,
Ls.6-8.)
However, the court rejected his request, instead focusing on his struggles during the rider
program, his "prior record[, and] behavior awaiting sentencing." (RR., Tr., p.10, Ls.15-20.) The
court said that Mr. Banfield needed specific programming because "I do think it would be
beneficial for everybody if [those issues] would get addressed." (RR., Tr., p.10, Ls.23-24.)
Despite that acknowledgement, by relinquishing jurisdiction, the court did not allow
Mr. Banfield to complete the training he started during the rider program. Accordingly,
Mr. Banfield asserts the court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Banfield respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing, or to be returned to the retained jurisdiction program.
DATED this 28 th day of April, 2020.

/ s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28 th day of April, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
RJS/eas
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